De nitions A nite n-person game is a set of n players, each with an associated nite set of pure strategies. Each player also has an associated payo function p i which maps from the set of all n-tuples of pure strategies to the reals.
A mixed strategy of player i is a convex combination of pure strategies.
Where the i 's are i's pure strategies.
Mixed strategies have a simple geometric interpretation as points on a simplex.
The payo function for pure strategies has a unique extension to the n-tuples of mixed strategies which is linear in the mixed strategy of each player.
Use S or T to denote an n-tuple of mixed strategies. These can bethought of as a point in strategy space", the product of the simplices for the players. We must use some i , and one of the ones we use must have p i S p i S, so i S = 0. Now if an n-tuple is xed by T , positive amount of i can't be decreased. But it's usage isn't increased in the numerator, so denominator must be 0.
This says all the i S = 0 . So no pure strategy i can improve the payo , which means that it is an equilibrium point.
Then, by Brouwer Fixed Point theorem, we must have some equilibrium point.
A symmetry or automorphism of a game will is a permutation of the pure strategies that ensures that strategies belonging to one player are still owned by one player, and preserves the payo value of the block" of each player's strategies.
A very similar method is used to prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium point, that is, one that is preserved under all autmorphisms of the game.
Solutions to Games
A game is solvable if any players strategy r i at some equlibrium point, can be substituted into any other equilibrium point and still be at equilibrium. The set of equilibrium points is the solution of the game.
A game is strongly solvable if it is solvable and if any strategy substitution at equilibrium which preserves the payo also preserves the equilibrium property.
When they exist, these solutions are unique.
A property that games always have is that of sub-solutions, which are subsets of the set of equilibrium points that are maximal relative to the equilibrium property.
The factor sets of a sub-solution S, the the i th factor set is the set of all s i 's such that S contains T; s 1 for some T.
Theorem 2 Geometrically, S is the product of its factor sets.
Theorem 3 The factor sets of a sub-solution are closed and convex as subsets of the mixed strategy spaces.
Theorem 4 Sets S 1 ; S 2 ; : : : ; S n of equilibrium strategies in a solvable games are polyhedral convex subsets of the respective mixed strategies This is a generalization of a known result for two-player games.
